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Abstract
In this paper we ask whether household heterogeneity and market incomplete-
ness are likely to have quantitatively important implications for the welfare eﬀects
of tax changes. To investigate this we compare a representative agent economy
with a model economy in which heterogeneous households face uninsurable labor
income risk. The stochastic process for labor earnings we construct is consistent
with empirical estimates of earnings risk, and also implies a distribution of asset
holdings across households closely resembling that in the United States.
In both economies capital tax cuts imply large steady state welfare gains. How-
ever, in the heterogeneous agent economy substantial redistribution during transi-
tion means that expected welfare gains vary dramatically across the population. We
ﬁnd that capital tax cuts are supported only by a minority of households, and the
experience of the representative agent is a very poor proxy for the average welfare
gain.
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The goal of this paper is to assess the consequences of changing the mix between labor
and capital income taxation for allocations and welfare. Much of the previous literature
has studied this issue within a representative agent framework, and concluded that sig-
niﬁcant welfare gains can be obtained from eliminating capital income taxes.1 However,
while the representative agent paradigm delivers clear policy prescriptions, it abstracts
from heterogeneity and asset market incompleteness. In most economies, capital income
is much more unevenly distributed than labor income, and the cross-sectional correla-
tion between capital and labor income is low.2 Changes in the mix between capital
and labor income taxes will thus redistribute the tax burden across households, and
tax reforms will generally not be Pareto improving.3 Furthermore, the assumption of
complete markets has been seriously challenged by many empirical studies.4 If asset
markets are incomplete, then changing the tax mix will change the amount of insurance
against idiosyncratic risk provided in equilibrium through the tax system and through
buﬀer-stock saving behavior. In this paper we ask whether introducing heterogeneity
and market incompleteness are likely to have quantitatively important implications for
the welfare eﬀects of tax changes, or whether the lessons from the representative agent
framework survive more or less intact.
1 See, for example, Lucas 1990. Lucas builds on the seminal work on optimal taxation in the
complete-markets inﬁnite-horizon setting by Judd 1985 and Chamley 1986..
2 For data on wealth and earnings inequality in the U.S., see Dias-Gimenez et. al. 1997.
They report a wealth-earnings correlation of 0.23 for 1992.
3 Examples of experiments in which some agents gain and some lose from changing capital
taxes include Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ 1987 and Garcia-Mila, Marcet and Ventura 1995 and
1996. Chamley 1998 is able to characterize tax reforms that leave all households better oﬀ,b y
focusing on tax changes pre-announced so far in advance that a household’s expected welfare
gain is independant of its current income and wealth. Note that a common assumption in all
these papers is that households cannot insure against the risk of tax changes. This is a necessary
condition for tax changes to have asymmetric welfare eﬀects.
4 See Attanasio and Browning 1995 for a discussion, and Hayashi et al. 1996 and Attanasio
and Davis 1996 for recent emprical work on risk sharing.
2To answer this question we study two economies. Our benchmark is the workhorse
incomplete markets model developed by Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari
(1994a). Here households diﬀer endogenously in terms of their asset / labor income com-
position because of idiosyncratic uninsurable earnings shocks. In our second economy
there are no idiosyncratic earnings shocks, but the (exogenous) distribution of wealth
at the time of the tax reform is assumed identical to that in the benchmark model.
We call this the no-earnings-risk economy. At the aggregate level, the response of the
no-earnings-risk economy to tax changes is observationally equivalent to the response
in a representative agent framework.
To quantitatively assess the importance for welfare issues of (i) heterogeneity and (ii)
market incompleteness we perform the following accounting exercise. For each reform
we consider, we compare the expected welfare gain for the representative agent (i.e.
a household with mean wealth in the no-earnings-risk economy) with (i) the average
expected gain across all households in the no-earnings-risk economy, and (ii) the average
expected gain in the benchmark economy. The tax reforms we study are permanent
unanticipated changes in the capital tax rate. The labor tax rate is simultaneously
adjusted to maintain long-run budget balance.
We emphasize two distinctive features of our analysis which have important im-
plications for interpreting our welfare results. First, we explicitly take into account
transitional dynamics. Pure steady state welfare comparisons are very misleading (as
we will show) in part because tax changes imply substantial redistribution in the short-
run.5 Second, our calibration strategy is designed to ensure that the amount of the
total tax burden that is redistributed as a result of tax reform is realistic. In particular,
5 As an alternative to our choice of rather simple tax reforms, we could have attempted to
characterize optimal policy when tax rates may be freely chosen at each future date. The problem
with the optimal taxation approach is that it is generally very diﬃcult to characterize transi-
tion outside the representative agent framework. Aiyagari 1995 describes the optimal taxation
(Ramsey) problem for an incomplete markets economy similar to ours, but only characterizes
the ﬁnal steady state.
3we construct an earnings process which satisﬁes two criteria: (i) the implied wealth
distribution closely resembles that observed in the United States and (ii) the labor in-
come uncertainty is consistent with empirical estimates from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. We consider our ability to construct such an earnings process to constitute a
signiﬁcant contribution to the literature on wealth and income inequality. While various
authors have speciﬁed processes for earnings that satisfy one of the two criteria, this is
the ﬁrst paper in which the earnings process satisﬁes both.6
Our main result is that both heterogeneity and market incompleteness are quantita-
tively very important for the welfare eﬀects of tax changes. One reform which illustrates
this involves moving from the current calibrated U.S. capital income tax rate of 39.7
percent to a capital income tax rate of zero. Eliminating capital income taxation is a
natural benchmark because this policy would be optimal in a representative agent econ-
omy. The reason is that our assumption that labor is supplied inelastically means that
this policy would amount to a shift to lump-sum taxation.7 We compute the expected
welfare gain for the representative agent and ﬁnd it to be equivalent to a permanent 1.5
percent increase in consumption.8
When household heterogeneity is introduced, however, the welfare eﬀects of the same
policy change dramatically. The average welfare gain in the no-earnings-risk economy is
equivalent to a permanent 0.7 percent fall in consumption. When uninsurable earnings
risk is introduced things look even worse; the average change in expected utility is
now equivalent to a permanent 1.4 percent fall in consumption. Moreover the majority
of households expect to lose from eliminating capital income taxation: 73 percent of
6 See Quadrini and Ríos-Rull 1997 and Castae neda et. al. 2002 for discussion of previous
attempts to account for wealth inequality
7 Of course, with exogenous labor supply there are many alternative optimal tax reforms in
a representative agent economy, since taxing initial capital is equivalent to taxing labor at any
date.
8 This is in line with Lucas’ 1990 estimate of the welfare gain from eliminating capital taxation.
Moreover, it is a very large gain relative, for example, to Lucas’ 1987 estimate of a 0.008 percent
gain from eliminating business cycles.
4households would vote to stay with current tax rates rather than eliminate capital
taxation in the benchmark economy.
In order to assess the robustness of our results to speciﬁc model features, we consider
two variations on the experiments described above. First we introduce endogenous labor
supply. Second we consider replacing capital taxes with a tax on consumption rather
than higher labor taxes.
With valued leisure, reducing capital taxation is even less attractive since higher
labor taxes are now distortionary. On the other hand, if capital taxes are replaced
with consumption taxes the policy does not look quite as bad. Nonetheless, our three
main conclusions extend to both these experiments: (i) expected welfare gains vary
dramatically across agents depending on their initial position in the distribution over
wealth and wages, (ii) the welfare gain of the representative agent is a very poor proxy
for the average welfare change, and (iii) few households support reducing capital taxes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic envi-
ronment. Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2. The Models
We consider two model economies, one with earnings risk, and one without. Both
economies are populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households. Households
supply labor inelastically (we consider a version with an hours choice later) and maxi-
mize the expected discounted utility from consumption. In aggregate, household savings
decisions determine the evolution of the aggregate capital stock, which in turn deter-
mines aggregate output and the return to saving.
There is a government which ﬁnances constant government consumption by issuing
one period debt and levying taxes. From the households’ perspective, debt and capital
are perfect substitutes, since the one period return to both is risk free, and there are
5no transaction costs. An equilibrium condition is that aggregate asset holdings at each
date must equal the sum of the capital stock and the stock of outstanding government
debt. To focus on the eﬀects of tax changes, we abstract from aggregate productivity
shocks or other sources of aggregate risk, and we hold government consumption constant
throughout.
In the benchmark model economy, households face idiosyncratic labor productivity
shocks, and markets which in principle could allow complete insurance against this
risk do not exist. Instead there is a single risk-free savings instrument which enables
households to partially self-insure by accumulating precautionary asset holdings, as in
Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994a) and Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998). An important
assumption is that no borrowing is permitted. This limits the ability of a low-wealth
household to smooth consumption when faced with a fall in disposable income.
In the no-earnings-risk economy, by contrast, all households have the same constant
labor productivity. Another diﬀerence is that since the momentary utility function is
such that period t consumption is linear in period t wealth, the absence of earnings
risk implies that the evolution of aggregate variables in equilibrium does not depend
on the distribution of wealth (see Chatterjee 1994), and is therefore the same as in a
representative agent economy. Thus the distribution of wealth is indeterminate.
If households diﬀered in their initial endowment of wealth but could insure against
tax shocks, then in the absence of earnings risk they would share equally in any welfare
gains associated with tax changes. We make the standard assumption in this type
of exercise that tax reform is a zero probability event, and that households are not
insured against tax risk. Thus the welfare implications of tax reform will be sensitive
to the shape of the initial wealth distribution. To facilitate comparison across the two
economies, we set the pre-reform wealth distribution in the no-earnings-risk economy
equal to the pre-reform wealth distribution in the benchmark economy.9
9 The aggregate capital stock in the pre-reform steady state diﬀers across market structures
6We now give a more formal description of the benchmark economy. The no-earnings-
risk economy is a special case in which all households have the same productivity. This
economy-wide household productivity level is normalized to the average of that in the
benchmark economy, which is 1.10
The environment
Each inﬁnitely-lived household supplies n labor hours per period. A household’s
eﬀective labor supply depends both on the hours it works and on its labor productivity,
which is stochastic. At each date, household productivity takes one of l<∞ values in
the set E. Productivity evolves through time according to a ﬁrst-order Markov chain
with transition probabilities deﬁned by the l×l matrix Π. The probability distribution
at any date t over E is represented by a vector pt ∈ Rl : pt ≥ 0 and
Pl
i=1 pit =1 . If the
initial distribution is given by p0 the distribution at date is given by pt = p0Πt.G i v e n
certain assumptions (which will be satisﬁed here) E has a unique ergodic set with no
cyclically moving subsets and {pt}
∞
t=0 converges to a unique limit p∗ for any p0.
Let A be the set of possible values for household wealth (the endogenous individual
state variable). We assume that a household’s wealth at date zero, a0, is non-negative
and that households are unable to borrow. Thus A =R +. Let (A,A) and (E,E) be
measurable spaces where A denotes the Borel sets that are subsets of A and E is the
set of all subsets of E. Let (X,X)=( A × E,A×E) be the product space. Thus X is
the set of possible individual states.
Let et = {e0,...,e t} denote a partial sequence of productivity shocks from date 0 up
to date t. Let
¡
Et,Et¢
,t=0 ,1,...denote product spaces, and deﬁne probability mea-
(see ﬁgure 2). Prior to imposing the incomplete markets wealth distribution on the complete
markets economy we therefore scale the distribution so that the sum of individual asset holdings
equals the sum of initial steady state aggregate capital and government debt.
10 We do not impose a no-borrowing constraint in the no-earnings-risk economy. However,
such a constraint would never be binding in this economy under capital tax reductions, which
are the primary focus of the paper.
7sures µt(x0,·):Et → [0,1],t=0 ,1,...where, for example, µt(x0,e t) is the probability
of history et given initial state x0 ∈ X.
The household’s problem
The timing convention is that et is observed before decisions are made in period t.11
In period 0, given the initial state x0 =( a0,e 0) ∈ X, the household chooses savings for
each possible sequence of individual productivity shocks. Let the sequence of measurable
functions st : Et → A, t =0 ,1,...describe this plan, where st(et;x0) denotes the value
for at+1 that is chosen in period t if the history up to t is et, conditional on the individual
state at date 0 being x0. Let ct : Et → R+ describe the associated plan for consumption.

















Let t =0denote the date of the tax change. At the start of period 0, ap a i ro fn e w
permanent proportional tax rates τk and τn are announced and implemented, where τk
is the tax rate on asset income12 and τn the tax rate on labor income. The real pre-tax
return at t to one unit of the asset purchased at t−1 is rt. The real return to supplying
one unit of eﬀective labor at date t is wt.









at +( 1− τn)wtetn (2.3)
all et ∈ Et,t =0 ,1,....
11 This means that for Z ∈ E0 µ0(x0,Z)=1if e0 ∈ Z and 0 otherwise.
12 The tax on asset income applies to interest income on government debt and rents to capital
net of a depreciation allowance.
8where at+1 = st(et;x0) ≥ 0.
Thus the solution to the household’s problem is a set of choices st(et;x0) ∀t and
∀et ∈ Et such that st(et;x0) maximizes 2.1 subject to 2.3 and st(et;x0) ∈ A =R +,




t=0 , tax rates τk and τn, and the
initial household state x0 =( a0,e 0).
Aggregate variables
From date 0 forward, each household’s productivity evolves independently according
to the Markov chain deﬁned by Π. Thus we can interpret pt as describing the mass of
the population in each productivity state at date t, given a population of measure 1 and
an initial distribution across types described by the measure p0. Since the measure pt
converges to a unique limit, aggregate eﬀective labor supply will therefore converge to
a constant given by
Pl
i=1 p∗




iei =1 . Thus aggregate labor supply is equal to n for
all t.
The distribution of households across both individual wealth and individual produc-
tivity at time 0 i sd e s c r i b e db yam e a s u r eλ : X → [0,1]. By integrating with respect to
λ we can compute other aggregate variables. Let aggregate asset holdings at the start










st−1(et−1;x0)µt−1(x0,e t−1)λ(dx0) t ≥ 1. (2.5)
Real per capita government consumption is constant and equal to G. The government
makes no transfers. Government debt issued at date t is denoted Bt+1 and is assumed
to be risk-free; the government guarantees the one period real return between t and t+1
at the start of period t. Debt evolves according to








Bt + Gt ≥ 0. (2.6)
where B0 is given.
Aggregate per capita output at t, Yt, is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas
technology from aggregate per capita capital at date t, Kt, and aggregate per capita
labor supply:
Yt = Kα
t n1−α t ≥ 0 (2.7)
where α ∈ [0,1].
Output can be transformed into future capital, private consumption and government
consumption according to
Ct + G + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt = Yt (2.8)
where δ ∈ [0,1] i st h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n .
Product and factor markets are assumed to be competitive. This and the absence of
aggregate productivity shocks implies a certain one period real return to saving in the
form of capital.13 Since the real one period return to debt is also known in advance (the
government guarantees it), in equilibrium the two assets must pay the same real return.
This is why it is not necessary to specify the division between capital and bonds in an
individual’s portfolio.
Equilibrium
We assume that conditions are satisﬁed which guarantee that a unique invariant
measure λ∗ on wealth and productivity exists for the initial constant tax rates and
quantity of government debt, and that for any λ0 the economy converges to λ∗ (see
Aiyagari 1994a). Corresponding to λ∗ and the constant ﬁscal policy are an initial steady
13 Of course, prior to the tax reform, households’ expectations over future after-tax interest
rates are incorrect.
10state capital stock, value for government consumption, and factor prices. We assume
that at date 0, the economy is in the steady state associated with λ∗.
A post-reform equilibrium for this economy is a pair of constant tax rates τk and




t=0 such that when all households
take prices and taxes as given and solve their maximization problems, the markets for
capital, labor and output clear, and government debt is stationary. A formal deﬁnition
of equilibrium is given in appendix A.1.
2.1. Parameterization
The model period is one year. All parameter values used are reported in yearly terms
in table 1. The parameters relating to aggregate production and preferences are set
to standard values. Capital’s share in the Cobb-Douglas production function is 0.36
and the depreciation rate is 0.06. The risk aversion parameter γ is set to 1, implying
logarithmic utility. The discount factor β is set to target a capital/output ratio in the
benchmark economy of 3.32 which is the value reported for the U.S. in Cooley and
Prescott (1995).
The household productivity process
The main question addressed in the paper is how the presence of heterogeneity
changes the welfare implications of tax reform, and the approach taken is to generate
heterogeneity endogenously as a consequence of households receiving uninsurable idio-
syncratic productivity shocks. Thus the speciﬁcation of the process for these shocks is
critical, since the choices here will determine how diﬀerent households are in equilibrium,
and therefore how diﬀerently they experience changes in ﬁscal policy. Broadly speaking
there are two desiderata for the earnings process. The ﬁrst is that the persistence and
variance of earnings shocks in the model are consistent with empirical estimates from
panel data. The second is that the model economy generates realistic heterogeneity in
11terms of the distributions of labor and capital income, so that tax reforms involve a
realistic redistribution of the tax burden.
We assume that the set E has three elements, E = {el,e m,e h}, since we found this to
be the smallest number of states required to match overall wealth concentration and at
the same time reproduce the fact that in the data the wealth-poorest two quintiles hold a
positive fraction of total wealth.14 To reduce the number of free parameters, we assume
that households cannot move between the high and low productivity levels directly,
that the fraction of high productivity households equals the fraction of low productivity
households, and that the probabilities of moving from the medium productivity state
into either of the others are the same. These assumptions constitute four restrictions
on the transition probability matrix, πe. Since each row must add up to 1, we are
left with two independent transition probabilities, p and q, where p = πe(eh,e h) and















Assuming that average productivity equals 1, the total number of free parameters
is four: transition probabilities p and q, and two of the three values for productivity.
Various authors have estimated stochastic AR(1) processes for logged labor earnings
using data from the PSID. Such a process may be summarized by the serial correla-
tion coeﬃcient, ρ, and the standard deviation of the innovation term, σ. Allowing for
the presence of measurement error and the eﬀects of observable characteristics such as
education and age, work by Card (1991), Flodén and Lindé (2001), Hubbard, Skinner
and Zeldes (1995) and Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (1999) indicates a ρ in the range
14 In an earlier version of the paper we constructed a two-state Markov process for earnings
with the same persistence and variance that reproduced the U.S. wealth Gini.
120.88 to 0.96, and a σ in the range 0.12 to 0.25.15 We therefore impose two restrictions
on our ﬁnite state Markov process for productivity: (i) that the ﬁrst order autocorrela-
tion coeﬃcient equals 0.9, and (ii) that the variance for productivity is 0.05/(1 − 0.92),
corresponding to a standard deviation for the innovation term in the continuous repre-
sentation of 0.224.
To generate realistic heterogeneity, we require that the Markov process for productiv-
ity be such that when the model economy is simulated, on average it reproduces certain
features of the wealth distribution recently observed in the United States.16 Given the
two restrictions above, the number of remaining free parameters is two, and we therefore
seek to match two properties of the empirical asset holding distribution: (i) the Gini
coeﬃcient, and (ii) the fraction of aggregate wealth held by the two poorest quintiles of
the population. The ﬁrst criterion ensures a realistic overall wealth distribution. The
second criterion is designed to capture the bottom tail of the wealth distribution, and
we include it because we expect that the households most likely to lose from reducing
capital taxation are those with below average wealth. Using data from the 1992 Survey
of Consumer Finances, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) report a wealth
Gini of 0.78, and ﬁnd that the two poorest quintiles of the distribution combined hold
1.35 percent of total wealth.17
The calibration procedure, described in more detail in appendix A.2, delivers para-
meter values that satisfy all four criteria. The ﬁnding that a model driven by a plausible
15 Heaton and Lucas 1996 allow for permanent but unobservable household-speciﬁce ﬀects,
and ﬁnd a much lower ρ of 0.53, and a σ of 0.25.
16 In an earlier version of the paper we experimented with including the Gini coeﬃcient for
earnings as one of our targets. We abandoned this approach for two reasons. First, while esti-
mates of the wealth Gini are stable across diﬀerent data sources, estimates of Gini coeﬃcients for
earnings and income diﬀer substantially. For example, Quadrini 2000 reports a Gini coeﬃcient
for income of 0.45 using PSID data, compared to 0.57 using SCF data. Second, in the model
we abstract from various types of observable heterogeneity, such as diﬀerences in education and
age, that we believe are essential for explaining the observed distribution of earnings. This is
why our model generates a Gini coeﬃcient for earnings of only 0.21.
17 Kennickell and Woodburn 1999 report a wealth Gini of 0.788 for the 1995 SCF data.
13earnings process can generate realistic wealth inequality is important in light of the de-
bate as to whether uninsurable ﬂuctuations in earnings can account for U.S. households’
wealth accumulation patterns (see Quadrini and Rios-Rull 1997). In a recent paper,
Castae neda, Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull 2002 are able to match more cross-sectional
moments but they are not concerned with the time-series properties of labor produc-
tivity at the household level. Table 2 provides a detailed comparison between the asset
holding distribution observed in the data, and the steady state pre-reform distribution
implied by the calibrated benchmark model. In addition to matching the Gini and the
wealth holdings of the poorest 40 percent of households, the model also comes close
to replicating the fraction of wealth held by the richest 10 percent and 20 percent of
households.
The wealth Gini in the U.S. is very high because a small fraction of the population
account for a large fraction of the wealth. In the model, productivity and wealth are
positively correlated, so having a small minority of the population enjoying relatively
high productivity helps generate high wealth inequality. Thus the calibration procedure
delivers transition probabilities such thata ta n yp o i n ti nt i m eo n l yas m a l lf r a c t i o no f
households (4.5 percent) have the high productivity level and the same fraction have
the low productivity level. The implied values for p and q are 0.9 and 0.99 (see table
1). The actual values for productivity are widely and asymmetrically spaced: the ratios
between the three values are eh
em =6 .06, em
el =5 .02.
Fiscal policy parameters
All remaining parameters relate to ﬁscal policy. The initial tax rates are calibrated
to match the actual tax rates in the U.S. Using the method outlined in Mendoza, Razin
and Tesar (1994) we calculate average tax rates for the United States using OECD data.
For the period 1990-96, the capital income tax rate averaged 39.7 percent, while the
14labor income tax rate averaged 26.9 percent.18
Constant government debt B in the pre-reform steady state is set to match the 67
percent debt / GDP ratio observed in post-war U.S. data. Initial constant government
consumption G is set to ensure budget balance and is therefore not an independent
parameter choice. However, the implied ratio of government consumption to annual
output is 0.22 (see table 3) which is close to the U.S. average of 0.19 for 1990-96.
2.2. Solution method
While techniques for solving for steady states in models with incomplete markets and
heterogenous agents are fairly well established, less work has been done on developing
methods for solving for transition between steady states in economies with produc-
tion and incomplete markets. Exceptions are Huggett (1997) and Conesa and Krueger
(1999). We describe our approach in appendix A.3.
2.3. Welfare measures
Our measure of welfare gains and losses is standard, and we now describe it for the bench-
mark economy (the no-earnings-risk economy is treated analogously)19.L e tcR
t (et;x0) be
equilibrium consumption after history et for a household with initial state x0 =( a0,e 0)
in the case in which there is a tax reform at date 0.L e tcNR
t (et;x0) b et h es a m et h i n gi n
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h e r ei sn ot a xr e f o r m .T h ewelfare gain for this household as a result
of the reform is deﬁned as the constant percentage increment in consumption in the no
18 Alternative methodologies for estimating tax rates give very similar numbers. For example,
King and Fullerton 1984 (Table 7.12) report an overall capital tax rate of between 37.2 percent
and 49.9 percent for the US in 1980. McGrattan 1994, using a methodology developed by Joines
1981, reports eﬀective marginal tax rates on capital and labor for 1980 of 48.0 and 27.7 percent
respectively. Mendoza et. al. 1994 report tax rates for 1980 of 46.9 and 27.7 percent.
19 In the no-earnings-risk economy, a household’s welfare gain or loss is a known function
of initial household wealth. In the economy with idiosyncratic earnings shocks we focus on
expected welfare gains.
15reform case that gives the household the same expected utility as when the reform is


























Using equation (2.10) we calculate expected welfare gains for households with various
initial combinations of wealth and productivity. These numbers are computed by ﬁrst
creating a large artiﬁcial population, each member of which starts out with the initial
wealth and productivity level of interest. The economy is then simulated forward (using
the appropriate equilibrium sequence for interest rates) under both scenarios for ﬁscal
policy.
The average welfare gain for the whole economy as a result of the reform is de-
ﬁned as the constant percentage increase in consumption in the no reform case that
gives the same utility under a utilitarian social welfare function as when the reform is






























We would like to be able to assess whether the changes in welfare that result from
a particular tax reform occur because the reform aﬀects the times series for aggregate
variables, or because it involves a redistribution of existing resources. We therefore
decompose the welfare gain into two components: an aggregate component (associated
with the change in the aggregate allocation as a result of the reform) and a distributional
component.
To deﬁne the aggregate component of the welfare gain, let b cR
t (et;x0) denote the
hypothetical value for consumption in the case of reform if the household got to consume















denotes aggregate consumption at date t i nt h ec a s eo fr e f o r m( n o
reform). The aggregate component of the welfare gain for a household with initial state























































With logarithmic utility, the aggregate component of the welfare gain is the same
for all households:
Proposition 2.1. If u(c)=l o g ( c),t h e n∆a
x0 = ∆a for all x0 ∈ X.
Proof. See appendix A.4
In light of this result, we shall henceforth simply refer to ∆a as the aggregate com-
ponent of the welfare gain.
If the aggregate component of the welfare gain from a tax reform is positive, the
reform will be Pareto-improving if it leaves unchanged the distribution of consumption
across households at each date (i.e. so that each household gets to consume b cR
t (et;x0)).
When linear tax rates are the only policy instruments, however, tax reforms will ef-
fectively redistribute income and consumption across households and thus the average
welfare gain will not equal the aggregate component.
17The distributional component, ∆d, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the average
welfare gain and the aggregate component:
(1 + ∆)=( 1+∆a)(1 + ∆d).
3. Results
T h et a xr e f o r m sw ec o n s i d e ri n v o l v em o v i n gf r o mt h ec u r r e n tU . S .c a p i t a li n c o m et a x
rate of 39.7 percent to a range of new capital tax rates between 0 and 50 percent. Figure1
describes the average welfare gains associated with the reforms, and the decomposition
of these gains into aggregate and distributional components (see above). This ﬁgure
contains some key results, which we now brieﬂy summarize prior to providing a more
detailed explanation in sub-section 3.1.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that average welfare gains are very diﬀerent across economies.
In particular, while any reduction in capital taxes is welfare improving in a represen-
tative agent economy, large reductions reduce welfare in the no-earnings-risk economy
and any reduction is welfare-reducing in the benchmark economy. Why is this so?
At the aggregate level, the response of the no-earnings-risk economy to tax changes
is observationally equivalent to the response in the representative agent framework.
The aggregate components of welfare gains are thus identical in these two economies.
However, the average welfare gain in the no-earnings-risk economy is not equal to the
welfare gain for the representative agent. This is because reducing capital income taxes
implies signiﬁcant distributional losses. The average welfare gain is maximized by re-
ducing the capital tax rate to 28.3 percent in the no-earnings-risk economy, whereas the
representative agent would prefer to see capital taxes eliminated.
Introducing market incompleteness changes the picture in two ways. First, the
aggregate components of welfare gains from reducing capital taxes are substantially
smaller; the aggregate component is maximized when the capital tax is reduced to 17.6
18percent. Second, the distributional losses from capital tax cuts are somewhat smaller
than in the no-earnings-risk economy. Nonetheless, in the benchmark model the negative
distributional component outweighs the positive aggregate component for all capital tax
reductions. In fact, the average welfare gain is maximized by remaining at the current
U.S. capital tax rate (39.7 percent).
T h el a s tp a n e lo fﬁgure 1 shows the fraction of households that ex ante prefer the
various tax reforms to the status quo. In the benchmark economy, between 69 and 73
percent of households face an expected loss from reducing capital taxation. Capital
tax cuts are only slightly more popular in the no-earnings-risk economy. Thus in both
economies a substantial majority favors the current tax system over the reduction of
capital income taxes.
The distribution of expected welfare gains and losses from tax reforms is very wide,
so that for a large fraction of the population, expected gains are many times larger in
absolute value than the average welfare gain. For example, when eliminating capital
taxes in the benchmark economy, the average expected welfare loss is equivalent to a
permanent 1.4 percent decline in consumption (see table 4). However, for a household
with medium productivity and median wealth, the expected loss is equivalent to a 4.4
percent cut in consumption (see table 5).
3.1. Interpretation
To understand our results, we primarily focus on the case of eliminating capital taxes.
This is a natural benchmark, since our assumption that labor is inelastically supplied
means that this policy is in the class of optimal tax reforms for a representative agent
economy. The results for this reform are summarized in tables 3-5 and ﬁgures 2 and 3.
The representative agent economy
Following the elimination of capital taxes, aggregate consumption falls and invest-
19ment rises as households take advantage of the increase in the after-tax return to saving.
Aggregate consumption stays below its initial steady state value for 12 years, but in the
long run, the capital stock, output, consumption and government debt all exceed the
initial steady state values (see table 3). The capital stock increases by 41 percent dur-
ing transition, which suggests large potential welfare gains in our economy. In fact,
the expected welfare gain for the representative agent is equivalent to a permanent 1.5
percent increase in consumption (see table 4). Of course, it should come as no surprise
that long-run consumption gains are quantitatively more important for welfare than
short-run losses, since eliminating capital taxes solves the traditional Ramsey problem
for this economy.
Introducing heterogeneity: the no-earnings risk economy
Garcia-Mila et. al. (1995, 1996) and Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987) point out that if
households diﬀer in the initial fractions of their income they receive from asset holdings
versus labor supply, then reducing capital income taxation shifts the burden of taxation
away from households who receive a large fraction of their income from capital and
towards those who receive a disproportionate fraction from labor.20 This is clear from
ﬁgure 2, which shows that immediately after the reform the after-tax wage falls and the
after-tax return to capital rises. Subsequently, as the capital stock increases, wages rise
and the return to capital falls. Even in the long run, however, the after-tax wage is
below its pre-reform level.
This redistribution of the tax burden has dramatic implications for welfare. The av-
erage welfare gain of eliminating the capital income tax in the no-earnings-risk economy
20 In their economy with two types of agent, Garcia-Mila et. al. ﬁnd that capital tax cuts
typically leave the wealth-poor type worse oﬀ. The switch from a general income tax to a labor
income tax considered by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ mainly beneﬁts the current old (who receive
a high fraction of income from wealth) while imposing large welfare costs on the current young
generations (whose income consists mainly of labor earnings).
20is equivalent to a permanent 0.7 percent fall in consumption.21 The welfare eﬀect is
negative because the reform hurts wealth-poor households with a high marginal utility
of consumption, and beneﬁts wealthy households whose marginal utility of consumption
is relatively low. Figure 3 shows the value for wealth (68.4 percent of mean per capita
wealth) such that all richer households beneﬁt from the tax reform, while all poorer
households lose.22
We can now account for the ﬁnding that most households lose from eliminating
capital taxation in the no-earnings-risk economy. Because the initial wealth distribution
is so skewed, only 29 percent of households have more than 68.4 percent of mean wealth.
This is why 71 percent of households oppose the tax reform.
Introducing market incompleteness: the benchmark economy
Introducing market incompleteness makes capital income tax reductions seem even
less attractive. The main reason is that the aggregate component of the welfare gain
from reducing capital taxes is smaller than in the no-earnings-risk case.
The aggregate component is smaller in the benchmark model because the precau-
tionary savings motive means that on average households accumulate more capital than
when they face no idiosyncratic risk. With positive capital taxes, the stimulative eﬀect
of precautionary saving on capital accumulation partially oﬀsets the depressive eﬀect
of distortionary capital taxation. Thus the potential welfare gains associated with the
change in the aggregate allocation induced by capital tax cuts are small.23 Similar in-
21 In a previous version of the paper we experimented with a smaller capital to output ratio.
The qualitative results in that case are very similar, but with a smaller capital stock redistrib-
ution is less problematic and welfare gains and losses are smaller.
22 This ﬁnding is simlar to Judd 1985 who studies tax reforms for an economy in which
households diﬀer in their initial capital holdings, and face no earnings risk. He shows that agents
with below average wealth will desire an immediate permanent capital income tax increase if
the current tax rate is suﬃciently low.
23 Note that when the capital tax is eliminated, the increase in the stock of aggregate capital
in the benchmark model is smaller than in the no-earnings-risk economy (see ﬁgure 2). This is
21tuition underlies Aiyagari’s (1995) result that if the optimal tax program in this type
of economy converges to a steady state, then the optimal tax rate on capital in that
steady state is positive.24 Aiyagari ﬁnds that the optimal capital tax should ensure that
the long run pre-tax interest rate equals the households’ rate of ti m ep r e f e r e n c e( s e e
Proposition 1, p.1170). Figure 4 shows that in our economy, Aiyagari’s prescription
involves a reduction in the capital income tax rate to 18.1 percent.25’26 This is close
to the tax rate that maximizes the aggregate component of the welfare gain within the
class of tax reforms we consider - that rate is 17.6 percent (see ﬁgure 1).
The negative distributional components of welfare gains are also smaller in the bench-
mark economy (see the bottom left panel of ﬁgure 1). This is because households now
face non-permanent idiosyncratic earnings shocks and, in contrast to the no-earnings-
risk economy, move around within the distribution over income and wealth. Since a
household’s expected productivity and wealth in the distant future converge to the
economy-wide averages, the extent to which a tax change redistributes the tax burden
is mitigated relative to the no-earnings-risk economy. Note, however, that there is con-
siderable variation in the experienced welfare gains of households with identical initial
wealth (see ﬁgure 3).27
Negative distributional eﬀects still swamp positive aggregate components in the over-
all welfare calculus for three reasons. First, the aggregate components of welfare gains
because the demand for precautionary savings falls during transition for two reasons. First, as
average asset holdings rise, the typical household becomes better able to smooth consumption
in response to income shocks. Second, the share of capital income in after-tax income increases
(see table 3) and asset income is riskless by assumption.
24 Similarly, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu 1998, in an overlapping-generations economy with incomplete mar-
kets, ﬁnds that the steady state welfare-maximizing capital tax is positive.
25 Figure 4 also indicates that in the no-earnings-risk economy, the long-run optimal tax rate
is zero.
26 Aiyagari 1994b ﬁnds the long-run optimal tax rate in a similar model calibrated to the U.S.
economy to be between 25 and 45 percent depending on parameter values.
27 For example, in our sample population with 20,000 households, the poorest household to
gain ex post had 3.7 percent of mean initial wealth, while the richest household to lose started
with 193 percent of mean initial wealth.
22are much smaller than in the model without earnings risk, as discussed above. Second,
the initial distribution of wealth is so skewed that tax reform involves substantial redis-
tribution in the short run. Third, idiosyncratic productivity shocks are very persistent
relative to the households’ rate of time preference.28 These last two points explain why
a household’s initial position in the distribution over productivity and wealth is so im-
portant in determining its expected welfare gain from a tax reform (see ﬁgure 3 and
table 5).
Wealth versus productivity
Clearly, if two households have equal productivity at the time of the tax reform
but diﬀerent levels of wealth, the wealthier household has more to gain from capital
tax cuts. Holding constant wealth, it is less obvious whether high or low productivity
households should gain most. On the one hand, high productivity households receive a
larger fraction of their income from labor and therefore face the largest percentage tax
increases following the elimination of capital income taxation. On the other hand, high
productivity households also want to accumulate wealth rapidly, while low productivity
households are typically dis-saving. Thus high productivity households are well placed
to take advantage of the temporary increase in the after-tax return to saving.29 These
two eﬀects largely oﬀset each other, so that the value for initial wealth such that a
28 There is some disagreement as to the true persistence of household productivity shocks.
We therefore recomputed the eﬀects of eliminating capital income taxes using the estimates
of Heaton and Lucas 1996 which suggest an autocorrelation coeﬃcient of 0.53 and a variance
for productivity of 0.2512/(1 − 0.532). With this process for productivity, the model generates
much less wealth concentration than is observed in the U.S., and eliminating capital taxes
increases average welfare. However, when we impose the same initial distribution over wealth
and productivity as in the baseline (high persistence) calibration, eliminating capital taxes
is almost as unpopular a policy as in our benchmark experiment. We conclude that initial
wealth inequality is a more important determinant of the welfare eﬀects of tax reform than the
persistence of the productivity process.
29 It is important to note that in the long run, the after tax return to capital falls towards its
pre-reform level. Thus only those with signiﬁcant assets early in the transition see much gain in
the form of higher returns following the capital tax cut.
23household is indiﬀerent between eliminating capital income taxation and maintaining
the initial tax system is similar for high and low productivity households (see the right
panel of ﬁgure 3).
Transition versus steady state
An alternative way to decompose the welfare eﬀects is to focus on short versus long
run eﬀects. We therefore compare the welfare numbers presented above with those
obtained by pure steady state comparisons. In the benchmark economy, the average
steady state welfare gain of eliminating capital taxation is equivalent to a 3.6 percent
increase in consumption.30 In the no-earnings-risk economy the steady state welfare gain
is larger, 5.5 percent. Comparing with the welfare losses in table 4 it is clear that the
short-run pain associated with capital tax cuts must dominate these substantial long-
run gains.31 Thus we conclude that steady state welfare comparisons are misleading in
these models, and that solving explicitly for transition is an important feature of our
analysis.
Which reform is best?
When we consider a range of possible new capital tax rates between 0 and 50 per-
cent, we ﬁnd that a utilitarian planner in our benchmark model would neither want to
reduce nor increase the capital tax rate (see ﬁgure 1). Any reduction in capital taxation
from the initial 39.7 percent rate is welfare-reducing since it eﬀectively redistributes
the tax burden in favor of a few wealthy households whose expected marginal utility
30 The wealth-earnings distribution diﬀers across steady states which makes welfare compar-
isons non-trivial. To calculate steady state welfare gains we impose the same initial wealth
distribution on all steady states, but scale the distribution so that the sum of individual asset
holdings equals the sum of steady state aggregate capital plus government debt.
31 Building up the aggregate capital stock during transition implies temporarily lower average
consumption and utility. Thus the steady state welfare gain for the representative agent is worth
a 9.7 percent increase in consumption, while the corresponding ﬁgure incorporating transition
is only 1.5 percent.
24from consumption is typically low. On the other hand, increasing capital taxation also
reduces average welfare since capital taxation becomes increasingly distortionary.
The result that the best reform is no reform stands in stark contrast to the ﬁnding
discussed previously that a capital tax reduction to 18.1 percent is required to satisfy
Aiyagari’s long-run prescription for eﬃciency. We conclude that Aiyagari’s prescription
does not oﬀer much guidance on how to set taxes in the short run. The broader impli-
cation is that in assessing the welfare eﬀects of tax reform, one should pay at least as
much attention to short-run redistribution as to long-run eﬃciency.
The importance of short-run redistribution is further illustrated by the following
experiment. Suppose, counter-factually, that the initial capital tax rate is 18.1 percent
rather than 39.7 percent. Figure 5 indicates that in this case maximizing the aggregate
component of the welfare gain dictates leaving tax rates approximately unchanged.
However, this does not imply that the utilitarian planner prefers the status quo to
changing the capital tax. Rather the planner would like to increase the capital tax to
39.0 percent, which is essentially the level estimated for the U.S. in the 1990’s. The
reason is that although small tax increases in this experiment have negligible eﬀects on
the aggregate component of welfare, the size of the (positive) distributional component
is close to linear in the size of the tax increase. Since we set the initial tax rate in this
experiment to Aiyagari’s long-run optimal level, the fact that a utilitarian planner would
like increase the tax rate indicates that Aiyagari’s Ramsey plan is not time consistent.
3.2. Introducing endogenous labor supply
The planner’s preferred policy is of course somewhat sensitive to speciﬁc model features.
One important feature is our assumption that labor is supplied inelastically, which means
that any shift towards labor taxation reduces distortions in the economy. With valued
leisure, reducing capital taxation is therefore likely to be even less attractive since higher
25labor taxes will now be distortionary. We quantify this intuition by recomputing the
eﬀects of tax reform when households choose labor supply.
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huﬀman (1988) we assume that the momen-










where n is hours worked, and ε>0 is the Frisch labor supply elasticity. We set ε to 0.3
as suggested in the survey by Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and we set χ so that the
average number of hours supplied in the economy is approximately 0.3.33 We recalibrate
other parameters following the same procedure used for the benchmark economy, and
in particular choose the parameters deﬁning the productivity process so that once again
the model generates realistic wealth inequality.
The results (see tables 4 and 5 and ﬁgure 6)c o n ﬁrm our intuition. With endoge-
nous labor the average welfare loss of abolishing capital income taxes increases to −3.0
percent. The main reason for the larger welfare loss is that eliminating capital taxes
is now associated with a large decline in the aggregate component of the welfare gain,
as opposed to the increase in the aggregate component seen in the benchmark (exoge-
nous labor) model. In this environment a utilitarian planner does not prefer the status
quo (39.7 percent) but instead would choose to increase the capital tax rate to 51 per-
cent.34 Nonetheless, our three main conclusions are preserved with elastic labor supply:
(i) expected welfare gains vary dramatically across agents, (ii) the welfare gain of the
representative agent is a very poor proxy for the average welfare change, and (iii) few
32 This utility function is convenient when solving numerically for allocations out of steady
state in heterogenous agent economies. This is because it implies that aggregate labor supply is
independent of the distribution of wealth. See Heathcote 2001 for a discussion.
33 For a recent study on estimation of the Frisch labor supply elasticity in the presence of
borrowing constraints, see Domeij and Flodén 2001.
34 The representative agent’s preferred policy with endogenous labor supply is to reduce the
capital tax to 14 percent rather than to zero (see ﬁgure 6).
26households support reducing capital taxes.
3.3. Consumption taxation
Several studies ﬁnd large welfare gains from switching to a consumption tax rather than
to a labor tax (see, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ 1987, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu 1998 and
Judd 2001).35 In the representative-agent exogenous-labor economy, these two tax re-
forms are equivalent since we restrict attention to constant taxes.36 When households
are heterogenous however, a switch to consumption taxes seems more attractive ap r i o r i .
First the aggregate components of the welfare gain should be similar since the reforms
involve the same reduction in distortions. Second, the distributional losses should be
smaller since the strong correlation between consumption and wealth means that switch-
ing to a consumption tax involves relatively little redistribution of the tax burden. The
numerical ﬁndings in tables 4 and 5 support this intuition for the case of eliminating
capital taxation. The average welfare loss from eliminating capital taxes is equivalent
to a 0.4 percent drop in consumption, compared to 1.4 percent when switching to a
higher labor tax. However, eliminating capital taxes is still welfare-reducing for the
majority of households. Thus, as in the economies considered previously, incorporating
heterogeneity changes dramatically the welfare implications of tax reform.
4. Conclusion
The main conclusion we take from this paper is that changing the balance between cap-
ital and labor income taxation is likely to have very large distributional implications.
Reducing taxes on capital income in our model does stimulate investment, raising ag-
35 Krusell, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull 1996, on the other hand, ﬁnd that when tax rates are chosen
through a political process, the median voter may prefer an income-tax-based constitution to a
consumption-tax-based one.
36 See Coleman 2000 for a discussion of consumption taxation in a calibrated representative
agent economy.
27gregate output and consumption in the long run. However, the short run cost in the
form of higher labor taxes is too heavy a price to pay for all except the wealth-richest
households. The implication is that in thinking about welfare one should pay at least as
much attention to these short run distributional eﬀe c t sa st ot h ef a m i l i a rr e s u l t sf r o m
the Ramsey literature that point towards lowering capital taxes in the long run.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Deﬁnition of equilibrium
We now describe the conditions that jointly characterize the equilibrium path of the
benchmark incomplete markets economy following a tax reform at date t =0 .
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t=0 is consistent with the transition
probability matrix Π in that for any Z = Z0 × ... × Zt ∈ Et
µt(x0,Z 0 × ... × Zt−1 × Zt)=
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3. The market for savings clears.









st−1(et−1;x0)µt−1(x0,e t−1)λ(dx0)=At t =1 ,2,....
(A.3)
4. Factor markets clear.
rt = αKα−1
t n1−α − δt =0 ,1,.... (A.4)
wt =( 1− α)Kα
t n−α t =0 ,1,.... (A.5)
5. The government budget constraint is satisﬁed and debt remains bounded.








Bt + Gt =0 ,1,.... (A.6)
Bt ∈ [0,∞) t =0 ,1,.... (A.7)
where B0 is given.
6. The goods market clears.








32A.2. Calibrating the productivity process
Consider the following AR(1) process for labor productivity









1 − ρ2 (A.12)
Equations resembling (A.10) have been estimated on panel data. Our goal to approx-
imate equation (A.10) by a 3-state Markov chain, preserving the estimated autocorre-
lation and variance of log productivity. Let ei, i =1 ,2,3 denote the three productivity
levels in our Markov chain, and let πi denote the constant proportion of households
with each productivity level in the ergodic distribution associated with the transition
probability matrix, πe.T h u s
P
i πi =1 . The matrix itself, reproduced here, deﬁnes the
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1 − q
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To enable comparison with the estimated process for log productivity, assume that




πi lnei =0 (A.15)



















33Let π1 and e2 be such that when the model economy is simulated, on average it
reproduces the two chosen moments characterizing the wealth distribution as discussed
in section 2.1. Once values for these parameters have been chosen, the goal is to adjust
the remaining free parameters so that the process for log productivity inherits the
properties estimated in the data. During this second stage, π1 and e2 are treated as
exogenously ﬁxed.
Since π3 = π1, and
P
i πi =1 , (A.14) can be rearranged to express q as a known
function of p.
q =
π2 − 2π1(1 − p)
π2
(A.18)
Equation (A.15) can be rearranged to give an expression for lne3
lne3 = −
π1 lne1 + π2 lne2
π1
(A.19)
Given π1 and e2, and expressions (A.18) and (A.19), the only remaining free para-
meters are p and e1.
From (A.12) and (A.16), equating the variances of the discrete and continuous
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Substituting (A.19) into (A.20) then implies
2(lne1)





















From (A.11), (A.16) and (A.17), equating the autocorrelation of the discrete and
continuous processes for log productivity implies that




2 + π2 (lne2)
2 + π1 (lne3)
2. (A.23)
Substituting in equation (A.20) this simpliﬁes to
















1. Solve for the initial steady state given the initial capital tax rate as follows.
1. Guess a value for the capital stock (and thus implicitly for output and factor
prices).
2. Compute the value for government consumption G, such that given the labor
tax τn, government debt B remains constant at the target debt to GDP ratio.
3. Solve for household savings decisions. We use the ﬁnite element method (see
McGrattan 1999).
4. Simulate the economy to compute a stationary asset holding distribution.
5. Check that aggregate household savings decisions equal aggregate capital
plus aggregate debt.
6. Adjust the guess for the capital stock and iterate until the market for savings
clears.
2. Choose a new value for the capital tax τk. Assume this is announced before
households make decisions in period 1.
3. Assume that the economy converges to a new steady state and that it is in this
steady state in period T.
4. Guess a sequence K2...KT−1 for capital during transition.
5. Solve for the new proportional tax on labor τn such that given K2...KT−1 and
τk, government debt is unchanged between T −1 and T. Compute the associated
path for government debt, B2...BT.
6. Solve for the ﬁnal steady state using the same procedure outlined in step one,
taking as given tax rates τk and τn and G and BT. Compute the capital stock in
the new steady state, KT.
7. Solve for household savings decisions in transition as follows.
1. Start in period T − 1.
352. Assume that:
1. capital today is KT−1 and capital tomorrow is KT.
2. consumption tomorrow (in period T) is given by the consumption func-
tion in the new steady state, cT(·).
3. Solve for the consumption decision rule at T −1 across the grid on individual
wealth and productivity, cT−1(a,e : KT−1,K T,c T(·)).
4. Continue moving back until we have decision rule functions ci(a,e : Ki,K i+1,c i+1(·)),
i =1 ...T − 1.
8. Now start updating the path of capital. The strategy is to take the initial steady
state distribution over wealth and productivity and use the decision rules com-
puted above to simulate the economy forward. Then we check for market clearing
at each date and adjust K2...KT−1 appropriately. For example, let b K2 be the
value for capital in period 2 that is implied by c1(a,e : K1,K 2,c 2(·)). b K2 is given
by aggregate savings in period 1 minus B2. We then set K2 = K2 +φ
³
b K2 − K2
´
where 0 <φ<1.
9. If the new sequence for capital is the same as the old, we have found the equilibrium
path. Otherwise go back to step 5, resolve for the new labor tax given the updated
capital sequence, and proceed.
10. Once the sequence for capital has converged, check whether T is suﬃcient by
increasing T and checking whether the equilibrium path is aﬀected.
A.4. The aggregate component of welfare gains
In this appendix we prove proposition 2.1. Beginning with the case of an individual
household, let ∆a

































































βt log(1 + ∆a
x0)
. (A.27)
36Now, consider the aggregate component of the welfare gain. Let ∆a be such that

























t=0. Then for all x0, substituting equation



























































βt log(1 + ∆a)
. (A.29)
Comparing equations (A.27) and (A.29) we see that
∞ X
t=0




βt log(1 + ∆a). (A.30)
Thus for all x0, ∆a
x0 = ∆a.
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Table 1: Parameter values (yearly basis) 
 
Capital’s share α  0.36 Debt  to  GDP  B/Y  0.67 
Depreciation rate δ  0.06  Labor tax τ
n  0.269 
   Capital tax τ
k  0.397 
Risk aversion γ  1.0    
     
Individual productivity process 
 
 Benchmark  No-earnings-risk  Endogenous  labor 
    
eh  5.087 1.0 4.740 
em  0.839 1.0 0.847 
el  0.167 1.0 0.170 
    
π(eh|eh)  0.900  0.900 
π(em|em)  0.990  0.990 
π(el|el)  0.900  0.900 
    
Discount factor β  0.965 0.965 0.961 




Table 2: Distributional properties of initial steady state: New τ
k = 0 
 Data  Model  economy 
 U.S.  1992  Benchmark  No-earnings-risk Endogenous 
labor 
      
Asset holding distribution in initial steady state 
 
Gini  0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
99-100%  29.6 11.7 11.7 11.5 
90-100%  66.1 60.0 60.0 60.5 
80-100%  79.5 83.7 83.7 83.8 
0-40%  1.35 1.33 1.33 1.36 
      
Earnings  Gini  0.63 0.21 0.00 0.31 
Wealth – earnings 
correlation 
0.23 0.31 0.00 0.34 
       
Asset holding Gini in final steady state  0.73  0.70  0.73 
        
Note: The data column is taken from Diaz-Gimenez et. al. 1997, whose data source is the 1992 Survey of 
Consumer Finances. “Endogenous labor” denotes the extension of the benchmark economy to include a labor 
choice.  
Table 3: Aggregate properties of initial and final steady states: New τ
k = 0 
  Benchmark   No-earnings-risk   Endogenous labor   Cons. tax 
  Initial    Final Initial Final Initial Final Final 

















           τ
c = 0.093
  G/Y  0.216 0.196 0.219 0.194 0.217 0.200 0.196 
             
 B/Y  0.670
* 0.918 0.670
* 0.965 0.670
* 0.957 0.975 
           
  K/Y  3.36 3.98 3.00 3.74 3.31 3.89 4.01 
           
  Y  0.647 0.711 0.606 0.687 0.681 0.736 0.714 
           
R  (%  post-tax)  2.84 3.05 3.63 3.63 2.94 3.25 2.99 
Post-tax asset to labor income ratio     
  0.245 0.359 0.284 0.415 0.250 0.385 0.318 
            
Note: Starred values indicate exogenous parameters. “Cons. tax” denotes the experiment when capital taxes are 
replaced with consumption taxes rather than labor income taxes in the benchmark (exogenous labor) economy. 
 
 
Table 4: Aggregate welfare effects of tax reforms: New τ
k = 0 
      


















              
Welfare gain  -1.42  -0.73  1.50  -3.04  -2.11  -0.41  0.55 
 
Aggregate component  0.23  1.50  1.50  -1.18  0.86  0.21  1.50 
Distributional 
component 
-1.65 -2.23  0.00  -1.86  -2.97  -0.62  -0.95 
              
Fractions in favor of reform: 
 Low  prod.  21.2      19.3    18.2   
 Medium  prod.  24.5      22.7    24.6   
 High  prod.  86.6      79.9    100.0   
 Entire  pop.  27.1  29.0  100.0  25.3  27.1  27.7  34.8 
 
Note: For each experiment in model economies with heterogenous agents we report results with and without 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In each case the second version is labelled, “no-earnings-risk”. 
  
Table 5: Expected welfare gain from tax reforms: New τ
k = 0 
     Wealth   
   Zero  Median  Mean 
  Productivity    
       
 Low  -4.88  -4.14  1.64 
Benchmark   Medium  -4.75  -4.43  0.67 
  High -2.09 -1.93 1.02 
     
No-earnings-risk   -4.18  -3.87  1.50 
(rep. agent) 
      
 Low  -6.70  -5.48  1.16 
Endog. labor  Medium  -6.55  -6.15  0.02 
  High -3.83 -3.67 -0.68 
     
Endog. labor,     
no-earnings-risk 
 -5.62  -5.26  0.86 
(rep. agent) 
     
 Low  -2.03  -1.87  0.41 
Consumption tax  Medium  -1.90  -1.80  0.34 
 High  0.55  0.61  1.78 
     
Consumption tax, 
no-earnings-risk  
 -1.00  -0.86  1.50 
(rep. agent) 
     
 